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Abstract: Confucian writings on ritual from the classical period (ca 8th-3rd centuries BCE), 
including instruction manuals, codes of conduct, and treatises on the origins and function 
of ritual in human life, are impressive in scope and repay careful engagement. These texts 
maintain that ritual participation fosters social and emotional development, helps persons 
deal with significant life events such as marriages and deaths, and helps resolve political 
disagreements. These early sources are of interest not only to historians and Sinologists, 
but also to philosophers and social scientists; they contain enduring insights into the 
nature and status of rituals more generally. This chapter surveys classical Confucian 
theories of the origins and functions of ritual, and summarizes some strident critiques of 
them from contemporary thinkers in the Mohist, Daoist, and Legalist schools of thought. 
The aim is to indicate key issues as well as promising strategies for analyzing ritual in 
Confucian thought and action. 
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Introduction 
Rituals are a ubiquitous feature of human life, and Confucian writings on ritual from the 
Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (ca 8th-3rd centuries BCE) are impressive 
in scope and repay careful engagement. We have, for example, instruction manuals listing 
codes of conduct (e.g. what to wear and say on ritual occasions, what emotions to convey) 
alongside treatises explaining the origins of rituals in human history, together with 
theoretical accounts of the functional purpose of rituals in human life. Taken together, 
these sources interest not only historians and Sinologists, but also philosophers and social 
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scientists; they contain enduring insights into the nature and status of rituals—a 
ubiquitous feature of human social existence. 
As we will see, the rites were awe-inspiring to these thinkers, who saw them as 
constituting the means by which sage kings of the past civilized the world. They were 
concerned that this civilizing effect was disappearing as ritual participation waned 
continuously during the centuries in question From their perspective, the decline of ritual 
coincided with the decline of good will toward others, the erosion of social cooperation, 
and the removal of protocols that help resolve political disagreements— the very stuff that 
allows groups of persons to live together in harmony. Put another way, the answers to 
questions on how to live well invariably invoked rituals. The Confucians therefore saw 
themselves as preserving and perpetuating an awe-inspiring cultural inheritance—the 
core of a dao 道 or guiding way of life. Because they were so devoted to the rites, the 
Confucians were motivated to defend them and articulate just why they ought to be 
esteemed. This forced them to clarify their own understanding of ritual in the face of 
strenuous and strident criticisms from rival thinkers.  
What follows is an overview of some components of the broad—and intellectually 
fascinating—category of ritual in the Confucian tradition. This includes Confucian theories 
of how ritual functions, the origins of the rituals as discussed in the tradition, and defenses 
of ritual against criticisms. Given the variety and complexity of the topic this essay will not 
be exhaustive, but will indicate key issues as well as promising scholarly strategies for 
analyzing ritual in Confucian thought and action. 
 
Ceremonial Rites 
No single term in English can capture the variety of meanings of li 禮 (rites; ritual propriety; 
ritual decorum) in early Confucianism. Upon first reading the Lunyu (論語) or Analects, for 
example, one quickly learns that li has a wide semantic range. Perhaps the most concrete, 
determinate meaning of li refers to formal ceremonies that celebrate or commemorate 
major events in the life of the individual, the family, the clan, or the state. This included 
ceremonies that marked the solstices, the seasons of planting and harvest, the signing of 
treaties, proclamations of new leaders, as well as weddings, funerals, and memorials for 
deceased ancestors.  
Ritual qua ceremony was thought to move and transform its participants. “When 
we say, ‘the rites, the rites,’ are we speaking merely of jade and silk?" asks Confucius 
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(Kongzi 孔子, ca. 6th century BCE). "When we say, ‘music, music,’ are we speaking merely 
of bells and drums?” (Analects 17.11). These are rhetorical questions; ritual and music 
(here understood as ceremonial orchestrations) were revered because of their salutary 
effects on people. The pageantry, the sounds, the careful coordination of the various 
performers, the meaning and emotion conveyed by every move and gesture, each detail 
was thought to be impactful. We are told, for example, that upon hearing the Shao music 
(the music of the royal court of the sage king Shun), Confucius is unable to savor meat for 
three months, so moved was he from the performance (Analects 7.14). Indeed, ceremonial 
music of this kind is heavily moralized throughout the text (e.g. Analects 3.25 and 15.11).  
Delight in and a sense of awe towards ritual is a prominent theme of this period 
in general (Eno 1990), and early Confucians wondered what about ritual made it so 
powerful. When Confucius is asked about the prestigious Di sacrifice (only performed by 
kings) he says “I do not understand it. One who understood it could handle the world as if 
he had it right here,” and pointed to the palm of his hand (Analects 3.11). Similarly, Xunzi 
(荀子, a 3rd century BCE follower of Confucius) marvels at how rituals bring proper balance 
to a person’s emotions during their observance.  
Ritual cuts off what is too long and extends what is too short. It subtracts from 
what is excessive and adds to what is insufficient. It achieves proper form for love 
and respect, and it brings to perfection the beauty of carrying out yi [what is fitting 
and right]. Thus, fine ornaments and coarse materials, music and weeping, 
happiness and sorrow—these things are opposites, but ritual makes use of all of 
them, employing them and alternating them at the appropriate times. And so, fine 
ornaments, music, and happiness are that by which one responds to peaceful 
events and by which one pays homage to good fortune. Coarse mourning 
garments, weeping, and sorrow are that by which one responds to threatening 
events and by which one pays homage to ill fortune. Thus, the way ritual makes 
use of fine ornaments is such as not to lead to exorbitance or indulgence. The way 
it makes use of coarse mourning garments is such as not to lead to infirmity or 
despondency. The way it makes use of music and happiness is such as not to lead 
to perversity or laziness. The way it makes use of weeping and sorrow is such as 
not to lead to dejection or self-harm. This is the midway course of ritual.2  
 
2 Xunzi, The Complete Works of Xunzi, tr. Eric Hutton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014), 209, modified. 
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Rituals channel, reshape and guide raw and universal emotions into appropriate gestures 
and expressions, fostering civilized acts and responses that conform to societal norms and 
role-specific paradigms (Sarkissian 2010a). 
Rituals can only be efficacious, though, if individuals approach them with feelings 
of reverence and awe, which in turn imbue the ritual with a kind of sacred authority (e.g. 
Van Norden 2007; Sarkissian 2014). By submitting to the power of ritual and ceremony, 
by bringing to it the appropriate mindset, by being present and attentive to others and 
minding its details, one not only experiences profound emotion but also signals to others 
a sense of belonging. Thus, rituals not only transform the self but  also bring about greater 
cohesion in the community at large. 
In this way, rituals contribute to good governance. The Analects, for example, 
maintains that governing by coercive mechanisms and threats of punishment makes 
people evasive (and shamelessly so), whereas governing through impeccable character 
and observing ceremonial rites prompts people toward goodness (Analects 2.3). The 
“Ritual Movements” (liyun 禮運 ) chapter of the Record of Rites (Liji 禮記 ) similarly 
maintains that ceremonies are a powerful tool of governing; through ceremonies, the ruler 
is able to clarify his intentions, reaffirm his status and his values, and leave the population 
free of questions or anxieties as to whether the government is ruling correctly, or whether 
the ruler merits fealty.  
 
Ritual Propriety 
A poem (#52) from the Guofeng section of the Odes reads: 
Look at the Rat 
Look at the rat; it’s got its skin 
Now look at this person without a dignified demeanor 
A person without a dignified demeanor 
Though not dead, what are they up to? 
Look at the rat; it’s got its teeth 
Now look at this person without right bearing 
A person without right bearing 
Though not dead, what are they waiting for? 
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Look at the rat; it’s got its limbs 
Now look at this person without ritual propriety 
A person without ritual propriety 
Why not hurry up and die?3  
This ode exemplifies the Confucian attitude to correct conduct. Rituals were seen as the 
only real basis for normatively correct social functioning. This goes beyond formal 
ceremonial occasions to encompass everyday manners and etiquette—the less formal and 
more fluid aspects of li that pervade everyday life. 
In a well-known passage, Confucius’ outstanding student Yan Yuan asks his 
teacher about ren 仁 or humaneness, the foremost virtue of humankind (Analects 12.1). 
Confucius replies, "Overcome yourself and return to ritual. If you are able to do so for a 
single day, all under the skies will respond with human kindness in turn. Human kindness 
must come from yourself; how can you rely on the lead of others?" When Yan Yuan 
inquires about specifics, Confucius replies, "If it doesn’t accord with ritual do not look at 
it… do not listen to it… do not speak of it…. do not move with it." Just as weddings and 
memorials have their own prescribed norms of behavior, so too the various ways in which 
we come to interact with others on a daily basis.  
Familial and social roles bring this into focus. Consider the routines that constitute 
a person’s life as it progresses over the years--what it means to be not just a child but a 
good child; not just a sibling but a good sibling; not just a student but a successful one that 
elicits appreciation and gratitude from one's teacher.  According to the early Confucians, 
all roles, whether friend, neighbor, teammate, worker, teacher, supervisor or any other, 
have ideals that ought to be modelled. Terms connected to roles have a descriptive 
meaning (referring to anyone who falls under the category) and also a normative one, 
evident when we describe someone as a “true teacher' or a 'great ruler.’ These roles are 
often comprised of dyadic pairs (e.g. teacher-student, ruler-minister), and provide concrete 
guidance on how to excel at them. It is in these roles that ritual finds its all-pervading 
presence in human life, where we must be attentive to our conduct in the ever changing 
roles we occupy, and reflect on how we would feel if we were the recipients of our own 
treatment.  
 
3 Arthur Waley and Joseph Roe Allen, The Book of Songs (New York: Grove Press, 1996), 43, 
modified. 
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Beyond role specific guidelines, everyday ritual concerns comportment more 
generally: wearing clean clothes, being amicable, honoring others' privacy, not flaunting 
one's good fortune, supporting others during hardships, and so on. Each of these may have 
ritualized aspects, though they can be more individualistic than what formal ceremonies 
demand and thus more conducive to personal style (Kupperman 1968; Kupperman 2010; 
Olberding 2007). Indeed, as noted above, merely complying with the formal aspects of 
ritual was considered inadequate. Yan Yuan cannot simply ape ritual’s dictates but must 
himself embody their spirit and give them a human face.4  
When we observe ritual decorum we signal to others that they matter, that they 
are affirmed and respected. Rituals convey respect and fellow-feeling in easily discernible 
ways, forestalling conflict and protecting individuals from offending, shaming, or insulting 
one another (Haines 2008; Olberding 2015; Olberding 2016; Sarkissian 2010b). Rituals 
enable one to signal emotions in predictable, discernable ways. Without such shared 
conventions, society would lack a 'cultural grammar'--shared norms and rules with which 
to structure social life (Li 2007). With such shared conventions social existence can have 
a magical, almost sacred quality (Fingarette 1972; Sarkissian 2010a). 
Along these lines, Youzi’s statement on ritual from Book I of the Analects provides 
perhaps the best summary of the Confucian position: 
1.12 Master You said, “When it comes to observing rites, harmony is most valued. 
It is such harmony that made the Way of the Former Kings so beautiful, and great 
and small followed it alike. There’s something that doesn’t work, though: you 
recognize harmony and try to harmonize, yet without regulating yourself by the 
rites--this will not work either.” 
Rituals are indispensable, then, to forming, shaping, perfecting, and signaling human 
affect in vivid, easily interpretable fashion. Communities of individuals thereby form 
networks of associations that foster widespread societal cohesion (Sarkissian 2018). 
 
The Origins of Ritual 
The Confucians believed that with the decline of ritual observance came the breakdown 
of trust and the seeds of socio-political disorder. But where did ritual come from in the first 
place? How did ritual take hold as a part of civilized society? If rites were introduced at a 
 
4 See, e.g., Paul Rakita Goldin, Confucianism (Berkeley: University of California Press), 22-23. 
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particular point in history, there must have been a time before rites. How do we get from 
a world without rites to one with them? Classical sources give two broad categories of 
explanations, which, for present purposes, might be labelled “constructivist” and 
“naturalist.”5 
The Constructivists 
Some early commentators maintained that sages-- uniquely talented historical persons-- 
established the rites for the benefit of humankind. Though having the same nature as other 
persons, they were driven by a desire to escape chaos and bring order to human society. 
To do so, they developed rites to structure and order human emotions. Rites, in this sense, 
are a form of technology aimed at taming, cultivating, and shaping raw human emotion.  
A canonical passage from the Xunzi expresses this perspective clearly. 
From what did ritual arise? I say: Humans are born having desires. When they 
have desires but do not get the objects of their desire, then they cannot but seek 
some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or limit to their seeking, then 
they cannot help but struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other 
then there will be chaos, and if there is chaos then they will be impoverished. The 
former kings hated such chaos, and so they established rituals and yi in order to 
divide things among people, to nurture their desires, and to satisfy their seeking. 
They caused desires never to exhaust material goods, and material goods never 
to be depleted by desires, so that the two support each other and prosper. This is 
how ritual arose.6  
The “Ritual Movements” chapter of the Record of Ritual, while downplaying struggle and 
chaos, also maintains that before the creating of rites people led a very primitive existence, 
sustaining themselves with raw foods, living in caves during winter and in nests during 
summer. They lacked civilization. The sages, though, changed everything. They created 
civilization: 
They harnessed the benefits of fire, they smelt metal, and they shaped clay. By 
means of these things they constructed platforms with roofs, as well as palaces, 
houses, windows, and doors. They were able to grill, roast, boil, and cook [their 
 
5 There is ongoing debate about how to interpret individual thinkers and texts. See, for example, 
Ivanhoe (1991), Hutton (2007a, 2007b), and Hagen (2007) for a debate about Xunzi and to what 
extent he might be considered a constructivist as understood here. 
6 Xunzi, Xunzi, 201. 
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food]. They were also able to make various seasonings. They gained control over 
fibers so as to produce hemp and silk [for clothing]. By means of these things they 
nourished the living and tended to the dead. They were able to serve the spirits of 
the world. All [ritual] follows from this beginning.7 
Further discussion of the creation of the rites is sparse. History records the bare fact that 
rituals were created, not how. Those details are lost. Nonetheless, the rites remain, at their 
core, the result of human artifice (wei 偽) (see Puett 2001). 
Constructivists did not hold, however, that any set of rituals would be as effective 
as any other. The rites were created to cope with human emotions. Whether lust, envy, 
elation, soul-crushing sadness, the rites were constructed to help humans work through 
basic emotions while living in harmony with others. The rites, in other words, are 
responsive to and must deal with human nature. The “Record of Music” 樂記 chapter of 
the Record of Rites, for example, explains that the ancient sages constructed rituals by 
"taking persons as their standard" (人為 之節), impling that we can identify normal or 
typical human reactions from abnormal, atypical ones.8 
With this in mind, consider a passage from the Analects in which the student Zai 
Wo (elsewhere compared to a wall of dung) complains about the three year mourning 
period ritually required upon the death of a parent. He notices, sensibly, that prolonged 
ritual asceticism would hinder one’s progress in other worthy pursuits such as self-
cultivation. What's more (and once again sensibly) Zai Wo notices that the progression of 
the four seasons may symbolize a cycle of life, so a single year of mourning could represent 
the beginning and end of an entire person's life cycle. Confucius’s response suggests that 
rituals are responsive to anticipated (i.e. normal) human emotional episodes, and so their 
form (in this case, the length of three years) are keyed to this normative conception of 
natural human grief. One year is simply insufficient. If one such as Zai Wo doesn't feel the 
loss, well, there's a deeper problem; he seems not to be humane (ren 仁). So there seems 
little point insisting on it. 
Constructivists, then, think that rituals were created in response to these raw 
emotions, constraining what forms they can take.  
 
 
7 Michael David Kaulana Ing, The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 108-109 
8 Ing, Dysfunction, 26. 
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The Naturalists 
The constructivist has a problem, though: if humans were initially uncivilized, whence the 
impulse to civility? If human nature is naturally disordered and uncultured, how can it 
produce the impulse to achieve order and create culture?9 Maybe the emotions themselves 
contain the seeds of an answer. If formal rituals correlate to basic emotional occurrences 
in people, then perhaps the emotions themselves are attracted—spontaneously and of 
themselves—to one course of action or other. From this view, the rites are not invented or 
created in response to human nature, but are instead expressions of it. Certain 
paradigmatic situations elicit certain paradigmatic (we might call them instinctual) 
responses, and these responses have within them the beginnings of a course of action 
that then forms the basis of a ritual.  
Mengzi (孟子, or Mencius, ca 4th century BCE) claims, for example, that certain 
instinctual responses give rise to certain coping mechanisms. He sees ritual as a natural 
phenomenon, arising as individuals coordinate their responses to momentous happenings 
that are a part of the general human experience. In a much-discussed passage (3A5), 
Mengzi defends the lavish funerary rites for one's parents as a natural emotional reaction, 
something that even critics of extravagance such as Yizhi (a rival Mohist) find it difficult to 
avoid doing. Mengzi explains that Heaven affords humans a normatively correct common 
root in human affect and inclination, which expresses itself in very particular ways. One 
can try to go against these inclinations, but this would create internal tension, leading to 
confusion and incoherence. “Does Yizhi believe that a man’s affection for his brother’s child 
is just like his affection some neighbor's child?" The answer is so obvious as to be left 
unsaid. Natural human affect varies systematically, and so too should burial rites. Thus, 
frugality cannot match up with emotional demands of grief at the loss of a loved one. What 
follows is a fascinating account of the origins of ritual. 
Now, in high antiquity there were some who did not bury their parents. When 
their parents died, they picked them up and cast them into a ditch. Another day, 
when they passed by, they saw that they were being devoured by foxes and 
wildcats and bitten by flies and gnats. Sweat broke out on their foreheads, and 
they averted their eyes to avoid the sight. The sweat was not because of what 
others would think but was an expression in their faces and eyes of what was 
present in their innermost hearts. They returned home and brought earth-carrying 
 
9 For discussion, see Wong (1996) and related papers in Kline & Ivanhoe (2000).  
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baskets and spades to cover them over. Burying them was truly right, and filial 
children and benevolent people also act properly when they bury their parents.”10 
We find a parallel account in the Record of Rites. In the “Questions on Mourning Rites” 
(Wen Sang問喪) chapter, the three year mourning period chapter is deemed to be simply 
“the fruit of human sentiment” and the desire to perform mourning rites “is not sent down 
from the heavens or sent up from the earth; rather, it is simply [a matter] of human 
sentiment”.11 For example, part of Confucian mourning rites throughout Chinese history 
has been the fu 復 ceremony, consisting of climbing on top of one's roof and calling upon 
the deceased to return. The explanation given of this rite is that it is what people already 
did spontaneously, a natural coping mechanism that had its origins in bouts of human 
despair.12 
The naturalist is not committed to the idea that the rites originally emerged in their 
best, most beautiful forms. Mengzi, like other classical Confucians, held that the Zhou 
('middle antiquity' in the paragraph below) perfected rites that began before them. 
“In antiquity there were no rules concerning the inner or the outer coffin. In middle 
antiquity both the inner and the outer coffins were supposed to be seven inches 
thick, and this was true for everyone from the Son of Heaven to the common 
people. This was not simply for the sake of a beautiful appearance but because it 
allowed, at the last, for the full expression of people’s hearts. If people were not 
permitted to do this, they could not feel satisfaction, and if they did not have the 
means to do it, they also could not feel satisfaction… Moreover, is it not a comfort 
to the mind to keep the earth from touching the bodies of those we love who have 
been transformed in death? I have heard that the noble person would not for 
anything in the world stint when it came to his parents."13 
So rituals arise out of natural affect and inclination, but they can be further refined (and 
were indeed perfected, by the Zhou) to best match and cope with the emotional needs 
that generate their existence in the first place. 
However, if we consider this general way of looking at rites--that is, as a 
formalized expression of affective inclinations--then rites are, in a sense, part of the 
 
10 Mengzi, Mencius, tr. Irene Bloom and Philip J Ivanhoe (New York: Columbia University Press), 60. 
11 Ing, Dysfunction, 26. 
12 Ing, Dysfunction, 195-196. 
13 Mengzi, Mencius, 43. 
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coherent way that the natural world works. Continuing this line of thought, one might end 
up wondering whether rituals cohere and resonate with the broader world or even the 
cosmos at large. Indeed, we find such accounts in the “Ritual Movements” chapter of the 
Record of Ritual, where we are told that ritual must ultimately “be rooted in the heavens. 
[It] moves [down] to reach the earth, extends to [all] affairs, changes and follows the times, 
and assists in demarcating boundaries”.14 Ritual is so encompassing in its scope, that it 
must ultimately be rooted in something non-arbitrary, something that is itself orderly and 
structured and harmonious and all-encompassing.  
 
Critics 
Critiques of ritual observance emerge early in the classical period and continue throughout. 
Critics charge that rituals are elitist and wasteful, that they do not promote widely 
recognized goods like order and a vibrant population, and that their role in fostering 
harmony should be seriously questioned. Mozi (墨子), a 5th century BCE moral reformer, 
found the opulent practices of the nobility—paid for through exorbitant taxes and forced 
labor—to be morally abhorrent. He attacked in no uncertain terms those who adhered to 
lavish ritual norms. Consider funerary rites, as previously discussed. 
“Nowadays… there must be an outer and an inner coffin, embroidered hide in three 
layers, jade emblems and jade already prepared, spears, swords, tripods, drums, 
pots, vessels, embroideries and silks, and funeral garments in countless layers as 
well as carriages, horses, women and musicians all prepared. They say the ground 
must be beaten down to make a road [to the grave] and the burial mound should 
resemble a hill. The interference with the business of the people and the wastage 
of their wealth cannot be calculated. This constitutes the uselessness of these 
[funeral practices].15 
In considering elaborate funerals, there is the burial of much wealth. In considering 
prolonged mourning, there is protracted prevention of the conduct of affairs. 
Materials already produced are buried and there is a prolonged prevention of 
further production. To seek wealth in this way is like preventing ploughing but 
 
14 Ing, Dysfunction, 24-25. 
15 Mozi, Mozi, tr. Ian Johnston (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2009), 225. 
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seeking to reap. As a method of bringing about wealth it cannot work. Therefore, 
to seek to enrich the state like this is altogether impossible.”16 
(Mozi makes similar arguments in “A Condemnation of Musical Performances”, and related 
critiques can be found in the syncretic Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (see Riegel 1995).) Even 
worse, according to Mozi, is that as experts and paid consultants on ritual the Confucian 
advocacy of extravagant burials is abhorrently self-enriching. Mozi writes, “When a rich 
man has a funeral, they are very happy and say delightedly: “This is a source of clothing 
and food.”17 
Mozi finds it simply incredible that sages such as Yao, Shun, and Yu (heroes for 
Confucians and Mohists alike) could possibly indulge in such extravagance. (If they did so 
indulge, then why venerate them?) He claims, instead, that these sages were buried in 
plain, unremarkable fashion. From the Mohist perspective, the demanding rites of the 
Spring and Autumn period were discontinuous with the modest rites of the past, and were 
perpetuated only because of conservatism (e.g. “This is what is called ‘[considering] one’s 
habits convenient and one’s customs righteous”—presumably a common saying of the 
time).18 
In the 3rd century BCE, Han Feizi (韓非子) pointed out the problems of trying to 
adjudicate these competing claims concerning the practices of the ancient sages. "Kongzi 
and Mozi both followed the Way of Yao and Shun and both claimed that they were the 
true transmitters of the Way of these sages, and yet the doctrines and practices that each 
of them accepted and rejected are not the same. Yao and Shun cannot come back to life, 
so who will determine whether the Confucians or the Mohists are correct?"19 Han Feizi 
pointed out that while there are those who find something to appreciate in each approach, 
they remain contradictory: 
When participating in funeral rites, the Mohists wear winter clothes if it is winter 
and summer clothes if it is summer. Their inner and outer coffins each measure 
only three inches thick, and they only wear their mourning garments for three 
months. The rulers of the age consider this to be frugal and honor them. The 
 
16 Mozi, Mozi, 217. 
17 Mozi, Mozi, 355. 
18 Mozi, Mozi, 227. 
19 Han Feizi, Han Feizi, tr. Joel Sahleen, in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, edited by 
Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, 2nd ed., (Indianapolis: Seven Bridges New York, 
2005), 352. 
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Confucians, on the other hand, will bankrupt their entire household in order to 
provide a lavish funeral. They wear their mourning garments for three years, and 
so destroy themselves with mourning practices that they are forced to walk with 
a cane. The rulers of the age consider this to be filial and honor them. 
But if one applauds Mozi for his frugality, one should condemn Kongzi for his 
wastefulness, and if one applauds Kongzi for his filial piety, one should condemn 
Mozi for his irreverence. Filial piety and irreverence, frugality and wastefulness—
these are all features of the teachings of the Confucians and the Mohists, and yet 
their superiors honor them both equally.20  
Finally, while the Mohists argue that we ought to modify rituals in the direction of frugality, 
other critics question the need for rites whatsoever. In the Zhuangzi, for example, we find 
the following anecdote. 
Zhuangzi was dying, and his disciples wanted to give him a lavish funeral. 
Zhuangzi said to them, I will have heaven and earth as my coffin and crypt, the 
sun and moon for my paired jades, the stars and constellations for my round and 
oblong gems, all creatures for my tomb gifts and pallbearers. My funeral 
accoutrements are already fully prepared! What could possibly be added?" 
“But we fear the crows and vultures will eat you, Master,” said they. 
Zhuangzi said, “Above ground I’ll be eaten by crows and vultures, below ground 
by ants and crickets. Now you want to rob the one to feed the other. Why such 
favoritism?”21  
This is a striking way of making a basic critique: who is to say what a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ 
burial rite consists in? What is the ultimate point of a lavish funeral? And how should we 
think of the greater cycle of life and death in which we, as humans, form only a small part? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
While the Confucian attitude toward ritual has been presented throughout this paper as 
consistently positive, Confucians also grappled with ritual’s troublesome aspects. Clearly, 
many rituals were thought to be efficacious in ways that, on sober reflection, were unlikely 
 
20 Han Feizi, Han Feizi, 352-353. 
21 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, tr. Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2009), 117. 
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to be true. Xunzi, for example, states in rather blunt fashion that superstitious beliefs 
concerning the ability of human rituals to affect the natural world are simply false and 
ought to be eliminated. The natural world operates on its own and its workings cannot be 
affected through entreaties, sacrifices, and the like (see, e.g., chapter 17 “Discourse on 
Heaven” tianlun 天論). But even setting aside these kinds of superstitions about the power 
of ritual to affect natural phenomena, there are more basic problems that routinely plagued 
Confucians’ faith in ritual.  
For example, the Record of Rites has recently been read as presenting a 
fundamentally tragic conception of ritual, since ritual performance routinely fails to 
instantiate order in a disorderly world (see Ing 2012). Ritual deviation is commonplace 
(whether owing to lack or resources or expertise, or misunderstanding the state of the 
world the ritual is meant to redress). So, too, is ritual failure. What is the connection 
between these phenomena? Confucians believed that some deviations from ritual were 
entirely acceptable (e.g substituting silk hats for the more expensive linen in Analects 9.3), 
but having certainty about one’s judgments in such matters is difficult, and ritual failures 
might be easily linked to such deviations. Nonetheless, such modified rituals do sometimes 
work, and seemingly flawless ritual performances, by contrast, sometimes fall flat. Why? 
Grappling with these issues was both a source of profound anxiety as well as a spur to 
repositioning one’s sense of what rituals can and cannot do. 
In spite of these tensions, though, ritual remains a source of fascination and 
veneration in the tradition. From specific descriptions of ritual performance to the more 
general statements about ritual’s place in human society and reflections and speculations 
on its origins and functional rationale, ritual is significant in key texts that lie at the very 
heart of the Confucian tradition. As a whole they constitute an incredibly rich and 
compelling portrait of ritual’s role in human life. 
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